Common Good and Common Action
Yves R. Simon ANARCHY is rarely or never upheld with consistency. In the pedagogy of Rousseau, there is a set purpose to let the child be guided by natural necessity rather than by human command, and to let him learn from the experience of physical facts rather than by obedience. "Keep the child solely dependent on things; you will have followed the order of Nature in the process of his upbringing. Never oppose to his unreasonable wishes any but physical obstacles or punishments resulting from the actions themselves -he will remember these punishments in similar situations. It is enough to prevent him from doing evil without forbidding him to do it . . " (Emile, II). Remarkably, the theory that the method of authority is a poor substitute for the pedagogical power of nature has been accepted, in varying degree of enthusiasm or reluctance, by most schools of pedagogy and has demonstrated lasting power. Yet the authority of parents and tutors is present throughout pedagogical theories, even when it is passed over in silence. Childhood is the domain where the suppression of all authority is obviously impossible. The most radical constructs of anarchy, as soon as they rise above the level of idle rhetoric, admit of qualifications so far at least as the immature part of mankind is concerned. Anti-authoritarian theorists, with few exceptions if any, do not mean that authority should disappear or that it can ever cease to be a factor of major importance in human affairs. What thinkers opposed to authority generally mean is that authority can never be vindicated except by such deficiencies as are found in children, in the feeble-minded, the emotionally unstable, the criminally inclined, the illiterate, and the historically primitive.
The real problem is not whether authority must wither away: no doubt, it will continue to play an all-important part in human affairs. The problem is whether deficiencies alone cause authority to be necessary. It is obvious, indeed, that in many cases the need for authority originates in some defect and disappe ficiency is attained. But the commonly associated authority never originates in the positive qualit society, is by no means obvious and should not b critically. The supposition that authority, in certai mains, is made necessary not by human deficien very nature of man and society -this supposition i absurd. To hold, in some a priori way, that it do examination would merely evince wishful think scientific kind. The truth may well be that author functions, some of which would be relative to defi affairs and others to such features of perfection a of human communities, their actions, and their ach If any functions of authority originate in nature rather than in deficiency, it can be reasonab that they are relative to common existence and tion. Granted that in many cases authority mer for self-government, the theory that it also has ess must be tested first in the field of community life. tion of this field presupposes an inquiry, no matter human sociability.
GROUNDS AND FORMS OF SOCIABILITY
The Needs of the Individual It is perfectly obvious that the needs of the ind for the association of men; yet significant implicat proposition are commonly ignored. For one thing, the individual need is often restricted, in most arbitrary needs of a biological, physical, material character. T of mutual assistance and division of labor in the f hunger and thirst, cold, wild beasts, and disease is mor expressed than the immense and almost constantl service that society renders to individuals in intellect moral, and spiritual life. Any improper emphasis on t needs served by society suggests that the purposes and ments of social life are contained within a sphere of m Concomitantly, it is often taken for granted that the spirit are altogether individual and that their pursuit ly individualistic concern. Thus, human life would a part socialized by material needs and a nobler part d would involve a good deal of fiction, but we have all the needed to compare, with regard to proficiency, students sepa by a few generations. In the fields where the social life o understanding is most successful -mathematics, physics men of the younger generation can solve with the resourc ordinary intelligence problems which were hardly treatab geniuses of earlier ages.
By another unwarranted restriction of meaning, it is o held that a need is necessarily self-centered. In fact, the n of need expresses merely the state of a tendency not yet satisfied ultimate accomplishment. Among the tendencies which make the dynamism of a rational being, some are self-centered and are generous; all admit of a state of need, and the need to giv no less real than the need to take. Consider the grounds of fri ship and the ways in which a man is related to his frien young fellow, uncertain about what he is and what he wan be, with little background, no estate, no steady position, much anxiety, will be looking for friends in a context of centered needs. No ethically unfavorable connotation attaches the notion of a need centered about the self. Whether the center of a need is within the self or beyond it depends upon the nature of the tendency involved and is antecedent to moral use. Needs relative to such goods as food and shelter are self-centered by nature and remain self-centered in the most disinterested man despite all the generosity which enters into his way of satisfyi his needs and of relating their satisfaction to further ends.
But some needs have their center beyond the self; a man who personality features contrast with those of the young fellow d scribed just above still needs friends. He does not depend on help of friends for food or shelter, for his fortune is already ma he is not in the least motivated by the expectation of physical ca in case of disease, for he is in good health and anyway has littl fear of disease and death; neither does it occur to him that may need friendly attention to soothe him in case of emotio disaster, for his nervous balance is well assured; and he does feel that the company of friends is necessary to him as protecti against boredom, for he does so well in the company of his ide ter of the act of giving is found in the beneficiary the gift is primarily designed to satisfy a need in the gift satisfies also a need in the giver. Such a need may attain a high degree of intensity. T person whom we are considering would be unh no children to please with Christmas presents, an ing from happy journeys would be gloomy if no to bring jewelry or dresses from the remote land would give him little joy if he had no chance to intellects, and the very firmness of his character him a tedious advantage if it should never res achieving greater mastery over himself.
For the sake of clarity, we have used the ex and accomplished person to describe other-ce such persons generosity is most obviously noti other-centered needs exist in all; they secretly men. To appreciate the power and the social signi centered needs in everyone, it suffices to remark frustration the tendency to act generously becom doubtable of antisocial drives. Men would rath destitution than be denied opportunity for disin sacrifice.
The Common Good
The question now arises whether the needs of the indiv are the only cause of human association and whether, corresp ingly, society has no purpose beyond the satisfaction of indiv needs. The word "individualism," which so often is made wor less by confusion, admits of a precise sense insofar as it desig the theory that the single purpose of society is the service o individual. The individualistic interpretation of sociability ap to souls trained in humane disciplines and possessed of an e ing sense for the human character of everything that pertai society. As soon as it is suggested that the purpose of human e lies in an achievement placed beyond th picion arises that human substance m to things as external to man as the p periods of history, voluminous facts sig of common good, republic, fatherland pursued may not be a good state of hum art designed to provide its creator with of creation. The joy of the creator assu the thing out of which the work of art soul. The artist's rapture is greates ter of his own creation not marble and b the image of God. "The finest clay, th man -is here kneaded and hewn. .... "
conceived as a work of art and a thing a corruption of the genuine common go tingency, every form or process adm affairs, the most dreadful counterfeit genuine form that it appears, with disq ly where the genuine form is most earn into the common good must involve c object may, at any time, be displaced by
To answer the question of whether designed to serve not only the needs goods situated beyond individual achi our attention, first, to the limitations o we may be able to understand, just by of human communities, how these limi Individuals are narrowly restricted w and inevitable circumstances hold in ch which belongs to rational nature. In ter there is no reason why one and the sam er, musician, philosopher, captain of in fact, personalities developed excellently lines are extremely rare, and significan found in Leonardo da Vinci and Goethe. The rule to which all men are subjected in varying degree is one of specialization the sake of proficiency. This rule entails heavy sacrifices even the most gifted. A man highly successful in his calling ac plishes little in comparison with the ample virtualities of He has failed in a hundred respects. Only the u can remedy the failure of each. But of all the restri upon the boundless ambition of our rational nature, ful concerns the duration of individual achievements. Within the temporal order we would feel hopeless if the virtually immortal life of the community did not compensate for the brevity of individual existence. Death is known to be particularly hard and surrounded with anxiety for those who end their days in individualistic loneliness.
These are the familiar facts referred to by a well-known text of Aristotle, ordinarily summed up in the following words, "The common good is greater and more divine than the private good."2 "Greater" expresses a higher degree of perfection with regard both to duration and to diversity. "Divine," as translating the Greek theion, does not designate so much a godlike essence as a participation in the privilege of imperishability. In this world of change, individuals come and go. The law of generation and corruption covers the whole universe of nature. This law is transcended in a very proper sense by the incorruptibility of the species and the immortality of human association. The masterpiece of the natural world cannot be found in the transient individual. Nor can it be found in the species, which is not imperishable except in the stat of universality; but in this state it is no longer unqualifiedly real Human communities are the highest attainments of nature, fo they are virtually unlimited with regard to diversity of perfections and virtually immortal. Beyond the satisfaction of individua needs the association of men serves a good unique in plenitude and duration, the common good of the human community.
Partnership and Community
To state the problem of authority, we still need an inquiry into the basic forms of association. The main patterns of human societies are the mere partnership and the community. Of course these two types may combine, but the obscurity of mixed realiza tions just renders more valuable the understanding of typic forms. Let us first consider familiar examples. A merchant succeeds in convincing an owner of capital that money invested in h business would bring nice dividends. By the terms of their contract, any profits will be divided according to a definite ratio 2 Eth. 1. 2. 1094 b 7.
Then the merchant goes to the market, back and awaits the event. Their "common interest" was celebrated in expectant toasts, but they are not engaged in common action designed to promote any "common interest." merchant works by himself or with his employees; he doe work with the money-lender, who remains a silent partner. W there is no common action, there is no common good. These t men do not make up a community. What they call their " mon interest" is in fact a sum of private interests that happen be interdependent.
In contradistinction to mere partners, the members of a c munity -family, factory, football team, army, state, church -are engaged in a common action whose object is qualitat different from a sum of interdependent goods. Whereas the tractual relation is normally the sufficient rule of the mere nership, our problem is precisely to decide whether the comm normally calls for the kind of rule known as authority.
To conclude this preliminary inquiry, let us remark that c tract and community can be related in diverse ways.
(1) association established by contract may be of such nature the relation between the associates remains exclusively contrac
The money-lender and the merchant exemplify such a cas
The association founded by contract may be of such nature a involve a common action. When they sign a contract, par may be entering into a society which is not a mere partnersh Such is the case, for instance, in the hiring of labor. Product demands that manager and laborer act together, and neither the character of a silent partner. However, communities o type can, in most instances, be dissolved at will, or according terms specified by the initial contract. (3) The community fo ed by contract may not be dissoluble at will. It may even such nature as not to be dissoluble at all. Because the contract is the only rule of the mere partnership, it is commonly assumed, by unwarranted inference, that persons associated by contract neces-3 The notion of contingency conveyed by "happen" is understood here with strict propriety. The fact that the capital of the enterprise, or part of it, is owned by a lender, is accidental to the commercial operations: these would not be essentially different if the merchant had inherited all the capital he needs. Consider, on the other hand, the cooperation of the surgeon, his assistant, the anesthetist and the nurses in the treatment of a surgical case: it would not occur to anybody to say that the purposes of these persons just "happen" to be interdependent. Their unity is not a sheer happening. sarily remain mere partners and can dissolve
The relation between man and wife involves a character of stability determined by the very nature of the man-and-wife community Yet this community was founded by contract.
If nothing abnormal occurs, the need for authority is never felt in a relation of mere partnership. The contractual arrange ment which, as such, is absolutely equalitarian, suffices. A deci sion by authority will be necessary only if the working of th contract is impeded by such accidents as misunderstanding, ba faith, or unforeseen conjuncture. Thus, if all human societies wer mere partnerships, authority would never be needed except o account of some fault or accident. The deficiency theory of au thority would be entirely vindicated.4 4 In fact, when the theory of anarchy took hold of a thinker free from any connection with the spirit of individualistic revolt and possessed with a strong sense for order and the excellence of the human association, this theory assumed the form of a contractual system-supplemented, however, with an authori tarian treatment of the relations involving significant deficiency. The social philosophy of Proudhon owes nothing to the romantic exaltation of primitiveness, cosmic emotion, infrarational life, individualistic solitude, and rebellion against society. The work of a mind intensely dedicated to "the creation of order in mankind" (the title of a book of Proudhon, 1843) and convinced that the masterpiece of the universe is human society, the Proudhonian theory of anarchy consists in an ambitious plan for the extension of contract to many relations traditionally settled by way of authority. For some time Proudhon recommended and promised the withering away of the state. Yet, a day came when he realized that every step in the conquering of the state was accompanied by a residual assertion of political authority, which thus proved irreducible and perennial. Proudhon's anarchism finally matures into a theory of federation, and there is no longer any question of eliminating the state. Rather, the state itself is forced into a contractual relation. In this reconsidered theory of anarchy, the general endeavor to substitute equilibrium for subordination, and contract for authority, does not spare the state; but instead of being, in Utopian fashion, driven out of existence, the archetype of authority, the state, is treated as the perennial partner of liberty. Insofar as authority itself enters into a contractual arrangement, the ideal of anarchy is not given up.
To the indignation of many, this unyielding anarchist, Proudhon, abides by the most uncompromising standards of traditional authoritarianism with regard to the family community. The inexperience of the child vindicates, with no need for elaboration, authority in the paternal relation. The case of the woman is not so obvious, and the intuitive genius of Proudhon, always somewhat awkward when there is a question of dissociating the components of an historical trend, never succeeded in avoiding misinterpretations. Proudhon did not explain quite convincingly in what respects the woman is equal to man and in what respects she is not. On his deepest level of thought, he believes that she is incomparably more subject than man to those irrational drives which originate in the cosmic part of human nature and in which he sees the worst enemies of justice and freedom. Assuming now the features proper to the kind of described as community, let us state the problem of Every community is relative to a good to be soug in common. But, by the very fact that a communit number of individuals, the unity of its action canno granted: it has to be caused. Further, if the com endure, the cause of its united action must be fir Since rational agents are guided by judgment, t bringing about unity in the action of men resolves lem of insuring the unity of their practical judgme ple, the family community would cease to exist if did not judge -for one reason or another -that reside in this particular locality and in this parti farm would soon be ruined if those engaged in the wheat did not all judge -again, for one reason o that these fields ought to be put into wheat this ye could not operate if the members of its personnel di that a definite schedule ought to be observed. A del sembly is indeed a community designed to stand disa in order that it should exist at all, there must be so regarding the place and time of its meetings, regar of procedure, and regarding some principles. In thes ilar cases, unity of judgment cannot be procured by munication. The believers in a social science which is that, in his interpretation, the philosophy of Rousseau deliv ety to the infrahuman powers of emotions, passions, natural cosmic drives, and that Rousseau calls freedom precisely this s infrahuman. Because of this greater subjection to cosmic na is a permanent minor and needs to be guided by father, husb son. At times Proudhon reveals that authority, which he ge confine within the family, has a part to play whenever a deficie makes it impossible for men to do by themselves the things th are supposed to accomplish without guidance. In his remarks Civil War in La guerre et la paix, first published in 1861, e H. Moysset (Paris, 1927) , pp. 176-180, he goes so far as to w those paradoxes which cast obscurity on the best parts of his w ern slavery supplied the proper circumstances for the training o had somehow to acquire the discipline of labor. Thus, the soci Proudhon is a theory of order through a system of contractu mented with a deficiency theory of authority. 
Rational Communication and Afective Commu
Since unanimity cannot be established in these by the power of demonstration, the ideally cl members of a community cannot be unanimous tuitous fashion unless a determined course of act by the virtuous inclination of their hearts. Whe to find its way in the midst of circumstances contin unique, the certainty of its judgment results fr with honest inclination. An ethical issue universal in charactersay, a general problem of justice -can be answered, as St. Thomas puts it, in either of two ways, the way of cognition and the way o inclination. In the way of cognition, the answer proceeds from principles by logical connections. This is how the moral philosopher is supposed to answer questions, and no other method is acceptabl in philosophy, because no other method p edge as knowledge.5 But an honest man tive processes may find the answer int cable fashion by feeling that such and s pleases or revolts his sentiment of justic virtue -as distinct from emotional counterfeits -and is sufficiently developed, the judgment dictated by such a sentiment of 5 The words "is supposed to" are not used casually. Moral philosophy is still in a rather primitive stage, and moral philosophers commonly fail to render obvious the deductive connection of their answers with the self-evident principles of the moral order. Their answers may still be true and good and worth adhering to: but the cause of their certainty is an inclination, not a deduction, and for a conclusion so attained to be safe, the philosopher's -or the theologian's -inclination must be sound, which is the same as to say that the fellow must be possessed, first, of genuine virtue and, second, of all the conditions and instruments required for the regular functioning of virtuous inclination as cause of true practical judgment. Of course whoever writes a book of ethics, whether philosophical or theological, likes the reader to believe that every bit of it is scientifically established: in case it were not, the only guaranty of his statements would be the perfection of his virtue: a thing that moralists, understandably, do not like the public to inquire into. agreement or aversion is certain. By love for what ju the heart of the just is shaped after the pattern of j inclination is one with the requirement of his virtue a will is virtuous is to say that its movements coinci demands and aversions of virtue itself. Between the appetite and ethical goodness there exists a unity of naturality, which constitutes a dependable source of p Because the just will corresponds in all its movements of justice, the inclinations experienced by the just ar ments uttered by the object of justice. Here, according of John of St. Thomas, "Love takes on the role of the It is entirely by accident that we can demonstrate s the requirements of justice or chastity, considered in gible universality, but it is not by accident that nobod strate what the rule of justice consists in under historically-conditioned, absolutely concrete, and poss dented and unrenewable circumstances. Here the r is not uttered by an essence and cannot be grasped b strative power of the intellect. It is uttered by the lov soul of the just and it can be learned only by listening ing of love. Take for instance the problem of own of extreme necessity. Our sense of justice acknow starving person, without money and without liberal right to save his life with food that he cannot pay f such a proposition can be demonstrated, and St. Th fully designated the middle term of its demonstra remarked that in case of necessity all things beco But argumentation will never establish a logical c tween the theory of property and the answer that I for when, already weakened by hunger, I wonder case is actually one of extreme necessity. A man in n for sure whether his necessity is extreme or not if is so just as to feel how far the right of his neighbo right go, so temperate as not to mistake an accidenta real need, and so strong as to fear neither the sufferi nor the resentment of his illiberal neighbors.
Thus, whereas a question relative to an ethical e answered both by way of cognition and by way of in way of inclination alone can procure a of human conduct involves contingency of common action as well as for those of individual conduct. Political prudence is no less dependent upon the obscure forces of the appetite than prudence in the government of individual life. However, with regard to unity of judgment among men, there is a significant difference between individual prudence and any prudence concerned with the conduct of a community. The prudence of the individual normally involves something singular and peculiar -it would almost be appropriate to say "eccentric." In their hopeless search for guidance amidst the obscurities of action, men easily assume that problems of individual conduct are the same for all, or at least for many, and that the rule which led one to a happy solution can be confidently followed by others. This assumption works sometimes, when problems are not significantly modified by individual circumstances; yet it is false, and may at any time bring about disastrous effects, for, in the broad field that lies beyond determination by ethical essences, it never can be said a priori that individual features are irrelevant. A life of moderate work and strict parsimony may be precisely what a certain family needs, but misfortune may befall a neighboring home unless the line followed is one of rather lavish expenditure at the cost of strenuous work, and in still another case real wisdom may paradoxically require liberal spending, an abundance of leisure, and willingness to go into debt. Of such contrasting rules of action, some may prove sound in a great number of cases and some may prove harmful save for rare exceptions. Yet it is never possible to know in advance -prior to an investigation of whatever unique features a case may comprise -that the rule required in this individual case is not precisely the one which would prove unsuited to nearly all other cases. Because of the possible relevance of unique features in the determination of individual prudence, each man is threatened with the contingency of having to make his decisions in utter solitude and to act like no one else. The anguish of such solitude is more than most men can stand, hence the tendency to take refuge in uniformity and conformity, even though precious features of individual destiny may be destroyed by adherence to common practice.
When the prudence of men is concerned with the welfare of one and the same community -their community -individual In groups small enough not to involve much error and bad will, the adherence of all to decisions that are necessary though indemonstrable brings about marvels of united action. As to larger communities -say, cities or nations -where all sorts of evils and deficiencies are inevitable, situations resembling unanimity and entailing most of the effects that unanimity would entail are a comparatively frequent occurrence. Consider the case of a nation attacked by a neighbor eager for territorial expansion. That 8 To see why the qualification "in principle," is necessary, consider the case of a leader who knows that, under the circumstances, he cannot resign, and that it is he, and no one else, who has to guide the community toward a certain goal. Two ways, a and b, are open; a would be preferable if it were not for a feature pertaining to the individual history of this leader, who cannot resign, but, his individual history being what it is, b ought to be preferred. In fact, whenever an individual feature modifies the ability of a leader to carry out a certain policy, this feature belongs to the system of data that public prudence is confronted by and has to reckon with. Yet history shows that spontaneous unity often characterizes th reaction of peoples in this predicament. If there were a que tion of polling opinion, it would be impossible to speak of unanim ity. There are traitors, collaborationists, neutralists, abstentionist honest men deceived by overwhelming illusions, and passive citizens without an answer to a question that never actually reached their minds. But these disrupters of unanimity are comparative few, and they carry so little weight as to make little difference Practically and for all significant purposes, the situation is abou what it would be if unanimity were realized. But after having recognized the marvels that unanimity, quasi-unanimity can work, let it be remarked that unanimity a precarious principle of united action whenever the common go can be attained in more than one way. All that has been said the foregoing about the power of unanimity simply makes no sen except when the way to the common good is uniquely determine If the common good can be attained in more than one way, neither enlightenment nor virtue, but only chance, can bring abou unanimity. Accordingly, if unity of action is guaranteed by other principle than that of unanimous agreement, it becomes a entirely casual affair, the result being either stalemate or divid and destructive action. Circumstances may be such that th happy life of a man-and-wife community can be easily attain either in Washington or in New York, but if one member of th community prefers, with the best of intentions, Washington, a the other, with an equally virtuous disposition, New York, t principle of action by unanimous agreement determines the separ tion of these well-meaning spouses.
There is nothing wrong with a man who, so far as he is concerned, likes to drive on the right hand side of the road, an nothing wrong with the fellow who, if he had his own choic would drive on the left. Thus traffic rules cannot be decided by the unanimous consent of enlightened and virtuous drivers. A suming that all good citizens are agreed that the public budg cannot be cut below such and such an amount, it is obvious th the money needed for public purposes can be gathered, witho injustice or particular harm, in a diversity of ways. Citizens ma without there being anything wrong with their intelligence or int To the proposition that authority, as the cause of exercises an essential function, a function made ne any evil or deficiency but by the nature of commo currently objected that any multiplicity of ways lea mon purpose is an illusion that social science, if be would dismiss. The problem involved here is that it pertains to the subject of liberty more directly t ject of authority.
When the theory of liberty is not enlivened by ethical enthusiasm, it often is surrounded by a clou as if liberty could be preserved only by cherished should yield to unique determination as soon as the about the proper way to our end. Indeed, everyo tells of deliberations that bear on illusory as well as If proper information comes before decision is ma the illusory means -the lines of action which, in s ances, do not lead to the end but to failure and p -everything is better in all conceivable respec that a wholesome simplification takes place whenev means is ruled out, we sometimes dream of carryin down to the state of unique determinateness, and w ine that in perfect acquaintance with the real state lines of action originally listed as means would, wi A man trained in one craft and unable to do has to work in uncongenial conditions; the man w can afford to be more particular about the circ employment. No one would say that the broad the man with many skills originates in ignora clearly, it results from a greater power and pres better knowledge. An industrial enterprise with produce only that which will surely bring immed privilege of contributing extensively to diversity market belongs to firms better financed. It is a American history that waste of natural resources initially by an acute shortage of manpower. T development open to a young community placed dance were the wasteful ones. We judge more sev of waste in those later generations which, owing t firmer establishment, more advanced techniques, forms of increased power, have choices that the not have. A nation with no navy, a very small ar stature, and declining population, if offered the erful neighbor, has to accept it albeit at the cost o and historical resentments; but given great bar nation can choose its allies. In all conceivable c power increases choice. The proper effect of enli cordingly, is twofold: improved knowledge r means and, insofar as it entails greater power, m uine ones. To destroy the illusion of a means i amplitude of choice, for, insofar as it extends to choice itself is but an illusion. In an ideally enlig nity, authority would be spared the unhappy the common effort, in the darkness of illusion, disastrous line. But, inasmuch as an excellent con edge implies greatly increased power, social scien tion would multiply genuine means and broad would, consequently, increase the need for autho of united action in the cases where the pluralit means renders unanimity fortuitous.
Strikingly, it is a better understanding of free discloses the essential character of the need for a All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms mon action. But why is it that whenever leading to the common good we are so str ute their diversity, and the correspondin to our ignorance of some relevant featu stubborn objection holds that if men wer adherence to the end would necessarily en ing the means. Let us briefly inquire int In all domains of understanding and in trivial or lofty and subtle, we are inclined ties of the better known subjects to subj known. This is why Aristotle -or som that it is unreasonable to seek at the same time the science of a subject and the method of this science:9 unless the method is known in advance -albeit in the most rudimentary fashionwe shall inevitably force upon the new study dispositions acquired in previous studies, for example, apply to medicine dispositions which proved excellent in mechanics, or consider ethics with the bias of a mind trained in theoretical science.
Notice, at this point, that the things pertaining to cognition are better known than the things pertaining to appetition and volition. Every time we turn to some aspect of appetitive and volitional life, we carry with us frames of mind and schemes of interpretation developed in our endeavor to understand cognitive life.
We are inclined to reconstruct appetition after the pattern of cognition. But cognition is not free from deficiency unless it is strictly determinate. If the problem is to know what the things are, nothing is worse than perfect indifference, the state in which a proposition appears just as plausible as its contradictory. Things are somewhat better if one part of the alternative is more probable than the other, but so long as one of the two is not excluded by unqualified necessity, cognition remains defective. With regard to facts and to essences as well, the faculty of choosing, at will, between assent and dissent is not an asset but expresses an entirely negative state of affairs. Accordingly, the understanding of cognition results in a pattern where perfection strictly coincides with uniqueness. But appetition is, in a way, the opposite of cognition, for, whereas the known is attracted into the knower, the lover is attracted toward the beloved, and whereas the true exists in the mind, the good exists in the things.1' This basic c the meaning of uniqueness, plurality and indiffe quiry moves from cognition to appetition. A plur assents with regard to one and the same subject e to attain truth with certainty; the indifference mind is made of inachievement, indeterminati passivity. On the contrary, a plurality of mean one and the same end evidences mastery, domi activity, superdetermination. The myth of a p which would eliminate authority and liberty r confusion of two kinds of indifference: the pa results from potency and inachievement, and the which results from excellence.
An Essential Function of Authority
The existence of a plurality of genuine means in the pursuit of the common good excludes unanimity as a sufficient method of steadily procuring unity of action. To achieve indispensable unity in common action, one method is left, which can be described as follows: whether we prefer to live in Washington or in New York, whether we prefer to drive on the right or on the left side of the road, whether we prefer sales tax, gross income tax, or their combination, whether we prefer a richer or a more austere orchestration of Bach, everyone of us, insofar as he is engaged in the common action, will accept and follow, as rule of his own action, one judgment thus constituted into rule for all. This rule of common action may coincide with my own preference, but this is of no significance, for the common rule might just as well be at variance with my liking, and I would be equally bound to follow it out of dedication to the common good, which cannot be attained except through united action. The power in charge of unifying common action through rules binding for all is what everyone calls authority.11 It may be a distinct person designated by nature, as in 10 Met. 6. 4. 1027b25. 11Between the concept of authority and that of law there exist enlightenin relations. It is, indeed, perfectly proper to speak of the authority of the legis lator, and nothing would warrant the identification of authority with executiv power. Many acts of authority assume the form of laws passed by assemblies. However, authority and law evidence opposite intelligible tendencies inasmuch as the more a proposition is expressive of necessity, the more it participates other things being equal -in the character of law, whereas there is nothing, i the concept of authority, that expresses aversion to contingency. A law rules Thus, authority does not have only sub in other words, it is not made necessary b know, by now, that in one case at least derives not from any lack or privation but human acts in the capacity of premise, not of con premise is independent of contingency, the more or absolute premises regulating human actions exp intelligibly following upon the rational nature. B home in the management of contingency and in t clusions. A decree which applies a law to a partic no less an act of authority than a law passed by an ciple that can be applied to indefinitely many par this law is already so particularized, and so engag be a sheer expression of natural necessity. Yet it re ise, and calls for further determination in terms o that an assembly cannot deal with. Common usag law and authoritarian government. Both of these e and their meaning has to be carefully specified. In authoritarian. On the other hand, "government by law" conveys the suggestion that propositions retaining the character of premises may suffice to guide a community in entirely concrete and perhaps unique situations, and this involves the nonsense of a premise which is also an ultimate conclusion. Provided these abusive interpretations are definitely ruled out, it is perfectly correct to use the expression "government by law" when a political system depends as much as possible on premises established by the wisdom of the legislator, and to call "authoritarian" the system of government which gives the few men in the executive power the greatest possible liberty to manage the concrete circumstances by connecting the conclusions of their choice with premises that have no other source than their pleasure, since no positive enactment ever gave these premises any juridical existence. of things. Given a community on its way to its comm given, on the part of this community, the degree which entails the possibility of attaining the good in of ways, authority has an indispensable role to play, originates entirely in plenitude and accomplishment. cy theory of authority is given the lie. An ideally en virtuous community needs authority to unify its act dent, it may need it less than a community which, a ignorance, is often confronted by illusory means. Bu it is more powerful than any community afflicted w ignorance, and as a result of its greater power it con involving new problems of unity which cannot be so of unanimity but only by way of authority.
THE FORM AND THE MATTER OF THE COMMON GOOD
Engaged in the pursuit of a common end, we delib ways of insuring the unity of our action. These may ways of authority or, should it prove impossible t principle of authority in an appropriate agency, t ways of unanimity. But the problem would not arise not already intending in common a certain end. Und problem relative to the unity of common action, the lems relative to the end of the action to be united. T in the theory of authority concerns the end willed i presupposed by the question of the way to unify this end. Let this problem be posed as follows: gra thority has an essential part to play in the unify toward the common end, does it have any essentia with regard to the common end itself?
The precise vocabulary worked out by Aristotl and improved by Aquinas (i-ii. 6ff.) can supply m clarity. In perfect accord with the best usage of guage, philosophers describe "volition" as the act will adheres to its end. If the end is considered, n as a thing good to attain, but more precisely as term or series of means, the act of the will is called " "Choice" deals with a diversity of means relative intended and willed. Thus, after having e ity has an essential function in the order o are asking whether it has, by reason of th not merely by accident, anything to do wi intention of the common good explicitly c
To say the least, appearances strongly su tion of authority concerned with the end It looks very much as if, in a communit enlightened and virtuous persons, the vo the common good should be fully insured persons. Whoever disregards the commo but selfish, and whoever is dedicated to ge very efficacy of his virtue, ready for any s good demands. It seems that ideally enl persons would be adequately related to the nity by their enlightened virtue. In soc and states of our experience, where selfish vail, persons have to be constantly direc toward the common good. Men of ill wil tage and ignore the good of all, and man and even generous happen to place the char where it does not belong. But suppose that are removed: the need for authority, insof itself is concerned, seems to disappear. community, would have no essential funct to the unity of common action when th genuine means.
It sometimes happens that a very simp bring into focus difficulties hidden by fam discussion of authority with regard to the it is decisively important to bear in mind t opposition between form and content with and intention. Consider this object, the absolutely good) and intended (as a term willed and intended in two ways. I may good without knowing what the thing is life of a man of good will is made of prob on the basis of a satisfactory answer to a All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms do the good thing and all would be perfect. There is an mony in the sinful will which adheres to evil things kn evil -known to bear the form of evil12 -and there harmony in the good will which, for the sake of goodne to things that are actually good. And between these two ies there is the daily problem of the man of good will w adheres to the form of the good but feels uncertain thing in which this form resides, in other words, the ma tent of this form.
So far as community life is concerned, the problem and form within the end can be posed as follows: Is i that the common good be willed and intended, both wit to matter and with regard to form, by private persons private capacity? In order to be sure that we reach t the issue, let us consider the case of a society with no di erning personnel. Here are a few hundred farmers w periodically into a people's assembly, and this assembly government of their community. Assuming that the or tuous intentions obtains, I recognize in each far capacity. Between the sessions of the assembly, he i
In the relation of man and wife, a dedi spects is the essence of indissoluble marria When the assembly meets, every citizen a new capacity. A man who yesterday was try on his family farm would today be b not belong entirely to the community. the common welfare, the relation is oft conflicts may arise at any time and a pub ber of the people's assembly, is boun welfare, regardless of how his private int stance, a certain method of taxation, p community as a whole, may cause serious d enterprise that he is managing. If a mem bly is known to have opposed a taxation than the threat of increased difficulty fo consider him, according to the seriousnes either a weak person or a despicably bad c accident of private interest interfering w discharge of a public function is inconcei of virtuous and enlightened persons whic subject of our inquiry. Considering, thu democracy who, by the very fact that the ing personnel, is the bearer of two capaci private, according as the people's assembly -and assuming, further, that this person capacity, I recognize in him two relatio and I wonder precisely what difference th relations.
The problem would certainly be overloo fied with the contrast between the pr Again, this virtuous citizen is dedicated ing the common good considered both in its form matter. And because the service of the common good involves an arrangement of things private, and sometim the sacrifice of private interests, the subject of the publ exercises authority over the private person, whose busin look after particular matters.
In spite of appearances, the essence of authority and obedience are integrally preserved in a community p government by majority vote without any distinct gove sonnel. The decisive question is not whether the matter of the common good is entrusted to distinct rather is whether, by reason of the common good's pri volition and intention of that in which the common go must be expressed by a rule of action binding on all. Th of a direct democriacy are inclined to boast of havin masters than themselves.'4 This attitude may mean m they like to do without a distinct governing personn same boastful words may express the will to eliminat constitutional contrivance, the essence of authority a obedience. The soul of the system is revealed by the tion of majority, minority, and opposition. A citizen w ever the assembly meets, finds himself in the majority, that he obeys only himself. But how is he going to feel majority votes against his preference? If he considers t he voted against is just as obligatory, and for the sam as any law that he voted for, he is a law-abiding and citizen for whom personal preference is altogether accid if a person considers himself free from obligation to a he opposed, we understand that he has always been a re 14 There are, in the history of mankind, only a few communit exclusively by the methods of direct democracy. But every democr ter how important the part that a distinct personnel plays in i embodies direct democracy in some of its political processes. Th may either pertain to the written constitution, for example, a ple the unwritten one -the influence of public opinion. In all cases th of a democracy are tempted to boast of having no masters except for they truly exercise much political power besides the electing of t The United States Constitution mentions two assemblies: the House and the Senate. There is a third one which does not need to be mentioned because its existence is obvious and which could hardly be mentioned in a written do ment, because of the indefiniteness of its role and power: it is the People o The Most Essential Function of Authority Thus, bringing about unity in common action is not, amon the functions of authority, the only one which should be describ as essential. Again, the problem of how to unify action -wheth by unanimity or by authority -arises only on the ground of an already determinate volition and intention of the common good Such volition and intention involve an antecedent function of authority, and this function, inasmuch as it is relative to the v end of common action, is more essential than anything pertai to means. The most essential function of authority is the issu and carrying out of rules expressing the requirements of the co mon good considered materially. This theory implies that two capacities are normally and de ably distinguished in every community. With reference to the known case, that is, that of the body politic versus its compone -individuals, families, and the like -these capacities have b called public and private. But in the present inquiry they shou rather, by the rule of strict appropriateness, be designated as c mon and particular. Indeed, the capacity thus far called pu exists in all communities, whether actually public, like a towns a county, and a state, or private, like a family. On the other ha we shall soon see that the basic opposition is not between common and the private but, more precisely, between the mon and the particular: for privateness is but one mode of pa ularity. The common capacity is defined by a relation to common good considered not only in its form but also in its m ter or content. As to the particular capacity, it involves a rela to the form of the common good but not to its matter. Clearly the particular capacity were related to both the form and matter of the common good, it would cease to be particular; t problem of authority would disappear, as far at least as the vo tion and intention of the common good are concerned. The wh theory truly stands or falls upon the answer to this simple qu tion: Is it desirable that there should exist, in every communi persons whose business it is, within the order of material consi Thus, according to a plausible hypot virtue causes the capacity described into the common capacity. A single capa gether relative to the common good. Th taking in hand the matter of the com come common. Such transmutation is gested when we voiced the conjecture th prepared to make all sacrifices requir should take one more step and, without ty, should will and intend the common g It remains to be decided how the comm by the disappearance or impairment of
The Function and the Subject
But let us first analyze particularity i community exercises several functions justice, defense, diplomacy, public wo relation to the whole life of the commu ly has the character of a part. But in w notion of particularity apply here? T defense. It is aimed at protecting all th wealth, all its counties, townships, fa function is altogether relative to the co the character of a part inasmuch as its of the community but only one aspe function is a certain aspect of a whol particularity in the case of the functio is sought may be an individual organism function is basic in biology; it may be a well be a community of any rank and subject considered is an organism, a per successful exercise of one function is on its good condition; if other functions a ruled out. A function may be public in the case of the functions pertainin politic, without ceasing to be particular but one aspect of a complex good.
In sharp contrast to the particularity This content downloaded from 153.104.155.57 on Wed, 17 Apr 2019 16:18:11 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms may be particular by reason of its subject. Consider involved in the upbringing of a child: taken togethe the whole good of the child, not one aspect of it. Bu child is part of the community, his is a particula communities, as the family, and such public commu township, the county, and the units of a federal or also related to the larger communities of which the as particular subjects. The state is the communit complete and self-sufficient that its good is not th lar subject -individual, family, township, and t unqualifiedly, the common good of men assemble of noble life.
Let us now examine the question of the excel particular in the two ways of particularity just def experiences suffice to show how desirable it is that f be clearly distinguished, and that each of them s cised with a special eagerness for what is unique good for the community that military men be d passion to national defense, bridge builders to th bridges, foresters to the preservation of forests, phy lic health, and classicists to the study of the classic larity of the function removes confusion and opens advantages of specialization. It is hardly possible task of building bridges and that of conserving for successfully fulfilled by the same persons; but even pened to be expert both in bridge building and in fo sion of social labor would still be necessary with and time. One reason why we keep re-reading th Plato is that it expresses better than any other boo community from which confusion is removed, and i is achieved, through wise division of labor and dedi cific tasks. A most enjoyable clarity pertains to the of the function, for every function is relative to an human affairs at least, every object is definable. W of a social function no longer can be defined, the f becomes meaningless: this is when reformers step i istration of justice, the conduct of foreign relation ment of public finances, and the like, are so many fined by perfectly intelligible objects.
Since functions are concerned with distinct a common good, functional diversity causes a need relative to the common good as a who among functions is the job of this cent public funds can be allocated to agri jeopardizing national defense or publi on which the function of promoting ag defending the national territory and good health conditions have nothing to paratory and indecisive fashion. Deci which, inasmuch as it is responsible for necessarily controls all of them and com aries.
The particularity of the function, as a negative feature of major significance tial manner, set limits to the authority authority is commonly restricted, and o ance of its functionaries: but this is an rence. Such resistance is foreign and function. True, it may be held desira possessed of some autonomy, and it ma they always are. But their autonomy is which is not that of the function. Th many products of political theory as we to the history of government. Because an instrument, the particularity of the despots do not dread. They know th equal, the clear division of social labo the efficacy of their power.
Let us now ask whether the particular ses an excellence of its own. No doubt, sion. A good way to make sure that e piece of land he is supposed to till is to steads. This is indeed a result of cons constitute an everlasting argument in f However, the power of removing confu particularity of the subject in strict ap belongs to the particularity of the funct ous discipline obtains and whose worker be easily replaced, has but minimum re of the subject. The feats of order acc organization of industry have given a n of a state which would keep free from The decisive fact is that the particularity of the its forms and degrees, involves autonomy. To use a ple, let us imagine that all the parts of a vast plain homogeneity in all relevant respects, produce th Within such functional unity, farming can be admi ing to the diversity of the tasks (plowing, ferti then it is a public affair, entrusted, say, to the Department of Agriculture. But the cultivation can also be entrusted to a multiplicity of farms ea governed by its individual proprietor. For the co meaningful, we must, of course, assume that other t Under definite circumstances, one system of ma insure a much higher yield than the other. On that the production is about the same in either sys whether it is better that the job be done by a mul ruling agents or by mere instruments of a central
To ask this question is like asking whether there fection in life than in lifelessness, in activity than mentality, in plenitude than in emptiness. Clea better off if its parts are full of initiative than if traversed by an energy which never becomes th can be learned from the fact that social thinkers a cians conduct, on the subject of plenitude versus v dialogues. The book of William James, A Plura forcefully expresses the metaphysical sentiment th rality, in the world of our experience, is the condit and plenitude. A totality which does not admit parts disappears into the vacuum caused by its imp gance. But the particularity of the subject, in the in the metaphysical world, harbors mysteries that uncongenial to the rationalistic mind. Whenever way in social affairs, rationalism exalts the clarity and crushes the particularity of the subject.
To be sure, contingency often makes it impossib in an entirely rational fashion the distinction betwe of the same functional type. What reasons could w if we had to explain why two states or nations rem by a borderline instead of merging into one unit? natural boundary is not absurd, and som nature serves quite reasonably to distingui another. Spain is south of the Pyrenees R of it. But in many other cases, the most f great East European plain, nations remai although they cannot claim any natura language supplies reasonable principles of u it also happens that people refuse to mer unity (the French-speaking Swiss and Belgi one nation with the French) and it also h of a nation (Switzerland) is in no way je of language. After having probed all suc diversity let us yield to the accidents of the final power of decision. Whatever is unexplainable, but in the world of action a cant, worthy, treasurable, without having tiality or intelligibility: it just is, it has bee and this is why it is significant, without a
The precise location of the borderline b United States is, in a number of places, ent by the decision of history the community is something else than the community cent D.C. Again, there may be no good reason w tween Colorado and New Mexico should be where it is rather than a few miles farther north or south. Yet it is hardly que able that the community whose main centers are Colorado Sp and Denver is, by the decisions of history, different from the munity whose main centers are Santa Fe and Albuquerque 
The Person
It is in the individual subject of human existence that we can best observe the relation between the mysteries of contingency and those of free choice. As a member of a species, distinguished within the species by the material components of his being, a human subject is more properly designated as an individual. Considered as a complete substance which owes to its rationality a unique way of being a whole and of facing the rest of the universe, he is more properly designated as a person. The fortune of "personalism" in the ideologies of our time is clearly traceable to the promises held by the notion of person, as distinct from that of individual, in the working out of difficulties which, though of all times, have assumed extraordinary significance in the last generations. Indeed, the word personalism often stood for doctrines and attitudes that "individualism" would designate with equal or greater accuracy. Such a confusing change in expression bears witness to the power that the idea of person came to possess in minds confronted by problems which, some time before, were not held so obvious and momentous. Many, who would have been satisfied with the language of individualism half a century ago, were necessitated by the spirit of the age to speak a personalistic language. But what is it that caused, in such a large variety of doctrinal contexts, the decline of individualistic rhetoric, and a new attention to the meaning of the person? With due allowance for profound diversities among the so-called personalistic schools of thought, it can be said that the displacement of "individualism" by "personalism" generally expressed the following insights:
(1) As recalled in the foregoing, the philosophy of individualism implies that whatever is called common good is merely useful, that things common are but means, and that the character of end belongs exclusively to the individual. "Means" and "end" must be understood here rigorously: a mere means is a thing which has no desirability of its own and which would not be desired at all if it did not lead to a thing desirable in its own right. The mere means, in other words, the thing that is merely useful, is just traversed by the goodness of the end. To treat the common (2) Another aspect of classical individualism concerns the role of material causality in human affairs. The features involved belong both to economic and political theory. The individualism of the economists proceeds, in part, from the stubborn belief that the best state of affairs is brought about by the independent operation of ultimate units, the independent money-maker, the individual supplier of labor-force, the individual consumer, the individual organizer, and the like, all moved by the power of individual well-being. Likewise, some democratic polities embody the postulate that what is best for the state is steadily brought about by the solitary determination of its individual components. These polities, famously associated with the teaching of Rousseau and with Jacobinism, strive to maintain the isolation of the citizen. The best state would emerge from the sheer multitude of its citizens and be confronted by nothing but such a multitude.17
16 These Saint-Simonian expressions (Exposition de la doctrine de SaintSimon, ed., by Elie Halivy and C. Bougl6 [Paris, 1924] , p. 127) are used here without the connotations implied by the Saint-Simonian philosophy of historical causality. For the Saint-Simonists, the great facts of change as well as the great facts of permanence in human history are determined by ideas, and especially by religious beliefs. Accordingly an organic period is defined as one "in which all the facts of human activity are classified, foreseen, and set in order by a general theory, and in which the goal of social action is clearly defined." A critical period is one "in which all communion of thought, all common action, all coordination have ceased to exist, and in which society has become nothing else than an aggregation of isolated individuals fighting against each other." The distinction between organic and critical periods remains meaningful without deciding whether the organic and the critical characters are due to beliefs or to factors of another kind, or to a diversity of factors including beliefs. The use of the word organic, as in "organic peri to conjure up the danger of attributing to society a mary character. Likening society to an organism m as long as we remain in control of our analogies an that society is not one after the fashion of an org individual members are not organs or cells but prim of human existence. What we need is a concept expre unique way in which an individual exercises members when the set is a community of intelligent beings. T is that of person rather than that of individual. Tru is sociable by essence and it is capable of playing the (the persons who make up the Senate are parts of and the individual, inasmuch as it is a thing "undivid and divided from all the rest,"'s implies a character o of the Social Problem, a subtitle attracts the attention of th Democracy is materialistic and atheistic. In Jacobin democrac the traditional picture of the Epicurean universe where all thi the encounters of particles, without patterns of wholes, without out final causes: "Universal suffrage is a kind of atomism by w lator, being unable to make the people speak in the unity of its the citizens to express their opinion by heads, viritim, just philosopher explains thought, will, understanding, by arrangem This is political atheism in the worst sense of this expressio general thought ever result from the addition of any numbe Lacroix, ed., A brief elaboration on the concept of materialism will help these confused, but challenging remarks. Let it be said, in gen a materialistic explanation is one which forcibly traces to mater belonging to causes of another description. This is the case whe rial cause needs to assume the character of a thing in act. Wha as such, potential; if, in order to play the explanatory role tha to play, it has to be credited with actuality, explanation is m proper sense. Since the parts are the matter of the whole, expl follows the line of the material cause whenever effects belongi of the whole are traced to the part. What the words of Proudh individualistic democracy, as well as Epicurean physics, credits ered in the capacity of parts with the ability to bring about th the whole. Individualism, in its use of material causality as we pretation of means and ends, pertains to the spirit of the criti the question is to dispose of the old order, to dissolve tradit destroy crippling structures, the theory that the greatest good r nonintegrated operation of the parts looks congenial enough the possibility of a new organic period is perceived, minds no confidently that the perfection of the whole will steadily proceed operation of the parts.
18 Sum. Theolo., i.29.4. and separation. But when the being wh person is considered as member of a set way of considering it in the theory of soc ety is that of an ordered set), the concep character of part whereas the concept of such restriction. As member of a set the simply a part. But because personality, in tion, expresses a universe of reason and f person implies emphasis on the privilege most intelligent forms at least, personal ties, had the merit of tracing to the uniq results from rationality and liberty effe of the critical period used to trace to th If atoms were persons, their arrangem many wonders that Epicurean imaginatio (3) Above all, the autonomy of the ind nature and as moral requirement, is incom by the notion of person than by that is desirable, in all respects and most pr common good, that the affairs of the sta federal power but by the state itself, and by the county, and the affairs of the to and the affairs of the family by the family able that the affairs of the individual m from important deficiency, be managed individual man is precisely considered as tegrity and rationality, when he is consi trol of his destiny, when he is consid contains its own law not merely by way 19 When individuation originates in matter, as stances, man included, to speak of the "autono a degree of inappropriateness. To be sure, indi omy, but the principle of their autonomy is no their individuality. Matter is that which has posite substance all that has the character of a l the form is specific and consequently all the law the law of its species. In order to reach the p with what is unique in the individual substance, which results from the union of completeness i rationality in specific nature: this is, by the cele the concept of person. Among the many writin person, see, in particular, The Person and th Scribner's, 1947 Indeed, it is historically absurd to speak of pers singular, as if the various personalistic movements of doctrinal unity. Endless variety is found in the p of their programs, and, whereas each of them is m opposition to some general feature of the modern jects of their oppositions may not coincide and ma with each other. Yet there is more unity in the av personalists than in their assertions, and of all the most steady concerns the predominance of functio of society. If the use of one word to designate such doctrines, attitudes, inspirations and moods can be it should be justified by the central significance, i istic movements, of the conflict between person and The Subject and the Person Thus, in terms of most essential necessity autho because it is desirable that particular goods sh care of by particular agencies. Some of these agenc by their functions, others are constituted by subje kinds. Along the line which goes from the broad narrow, a particular subject may be a state in a f county in a state, a township in a county, a family The ultimateness of the individual is accompanied b ence of significant features: this whole, the ind possessed of substantial unity, whereas the other township, family, are not. And by reason of its this whole, the individual man, is, in a way, all to the absoluteness of the good, and thereby ach over its own acts. Extreme amplitude arises just narrow unit is attained, for it is not in a merel sense that a complete substance of rational na to be a universe. As soon as this is understoo is shed on the particularity of the ante for instance, is not just a smaller group of its members is, all things; a fam universes, each of which is in control perfection that no solar system can ach character of totality which belongs to t rational nature, the whole system of th a family, a township, a county are pa particular after the fashion of the subj but of these parts the ultimate compon a way comprehend all things. At all l the presence of the person causes the en ality, and liberty to be present.
Looking again at the series of the part the opposite standpoint, let us now rem lar of them, the person, comes to exist, bility, in subjects that are less and less p a community describable as complete.20 character of the person, much confusio attention were given to the difference they involve a commitment of the self in its dist No doubt, disinterested tendencies and other-cen present in animals, but so long as the reason is n individual agent contributes only a tendency toward faction. Disinterestedness and other-centeredness are contributed by nature; in other words, they are caused by a dynamism antecedent to individual activity. The experience of human disorde shows that a tendency which, by nature, is disinterested and which in fact, serves another subject, may involve no generosity on the part of the agent. Thus, some mothers love their children in selfish way; out of selfish love they would do many things beneficial to the child, expose themselves to great dangers and inflict up on themselves great sacrifices. Here, other-centered needs are satisfied and some acts demanded by disinterested tendencies are elicited But the way of acting remains interested and self-centered. Ef fects of generous love are brought into existence without gene rosity. Much is given, and yet action does not proceed by way of gift. When the devotion of a mother to her child bears these characteristics, it is commonly interpreted as an animal passion and thereby we mean that it is nature -that is, a dynamism antecedent to reason and voluntariness -which places the effec of love in another rather than in the acting self. It is only where reason, voluntariness, and free choice are at work that the subject takes care of transcending its subjectivity: then actions that ar gifts also proceed by way of gift. Such disinterestedness, whic concerns both the content and the ways of action, originates in rationality, but inasmuch as it implies the actual transcending of the self by itself, it is traceable, in strict appropriateness, to the way of subsisting and to the way of acting which belong to complete substance of rational nature. In short, it is traceabl to personality. Qualities are transcended and the relation of friendship is established on its true basis. As long as it is directed to qualities, friendship remains uncertain: it achieves complete genuineness only when it exists between person and person, regard less of what happens to the qualities of the beloved. Then, the question why one loves is best answered -if this can be called an answer -by pointing to what is unique and unutterabl about a person. This state of affairs is powerfully described in celebrated essay of Montaigne. "If I am entreated to say why I loved him, I feel that this cannot be expressed except by answer ing 'Because it was he, because it was I.' Beyond all my discours and whatever I can say distinctly abou unexplainable and overwhelming force union."21 In all likelihood Pascal was co when he wrote these words:
But if one loves another one because of his beauty, does h love him? No: for smallpox, which kills the beauty withou killing the person, will put an end to love. And if one lov me for my judgment, for my memory, does one love me? N for I can lose these qualities without losing myself. But wher is this self, if it is neither in the body, nor in the soul? and how would it be possible to love the body and the soul, excep for these qualities, which do not constitute the self, since the are perishable? should one love the substance of the soul of a person abstractly, and regardless of the qualities in it? th cannot be, and that would be unfair. Thus, one never love any person, but only qualities.22
The last sentence will be misunderstood unless it is held to express the sorrowful perplexity of a man who does not see t answer to a question that he has stated with extreme keenne Pascal knows that the object of genuine love cannot be anythi else than the self. Then, perhaps with some bitterness, he tur to the fact that people are liked and loved because of their qualities, which seems to imply that they never are loved genuinely an that they are bound to remain unhappy. Both in terms of natur possibility and in terms of justice, he sees no way out of this fatef state of affairs. Apparently, he is not unaware of the difference between "being an object of love," and "being a ground of lov on the one hand, he speaks of loving a person because of his beaut for his judgment, for his memory; on the other hand, he speaks o loving qualities, not persons. To get more out of the distincti between ground and object of love, let us see in what sense frien ship can make itself independent of its own grounds. Indeed, the only thing that human love cannot do is to create out of nothing the goodness, the desirability of its object. Divine love alone caus the beloved to be good, independently of any goodness anteceden to love. In order to be an object for the love of a creature, thing must already be good: in that sense it is true that no one i loved or liked by his fellow man except for his qualities. But, although many of these qualities are subject to destruction -t To sum all up, let us imagine, again, that the community, in a supreme act of boundless dedica will and intend, under all circumstances, the matter good as well as its form. By this resolution the part is abolished: from now on, it will be up to the co to take care of the most particular business.
As far as the function is concerned, the disappea particular capacity results in a loss of order, and am which make up order those are more directly and s aged which are rational in character. As far as t concerned, the disappearance of the particular ca also a loss of order, and this damage is greater w mostly made of historical settlement. If the particu subject alone were impaired, and its ordering power to the function, as in the Republic of Plato, whatev in the arrangement of the state would be replace disposition, and this would make a great deal of d any impairment of particularity, in the case of the a loss of autonomy.
It is the excellence of autonomy which vindic ticularity of the subject and whatever forms of autho for the preservation of this particularity. Familiar transcended, authority and autonomy do not con other and do not restrict each other. They cause an another. But no rebel perceives the great unity, which obtains at this very deep level. teriority of the law, a condition which, is not native, but has to be achieved Rebels hate the sacrifices that the interio It is bad enough for them that the law and hover around after the fashion o never lead them to the understanding of of autonomy is itself a counterfeit.
